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Introduction
When the United States Supreme Court decides a case, the exact meaning of its
decision is often amorphous. Did the Court merely decide the case before it based on the
unique set of facts with which it was presented, or did the Court establish a more
categorical rule applicable in all cases involving the same subject matter? As courts of
appeal begin to use the Court's ruling as precedent, they often apply it inconsistently.
Some appellate courts will hold that the law of the case is absolute and reject any
exceptions attorneys attempt to rationalize. Others will hold that the Court's decision
was entirely contingent on certain facts and refuse to apply the case even to closely
analogous factual circumstances. Such an inconsistency in implementation typically is
referred to as a "circuit split" as the circuit courts are split over how to use the Court's
ruling as precedent.
Since the 1963 case Brady v. Maryland, the Supreme Court has held that a
prosecutor's failure to disclose material evidence to an accused can be the basis for
granting that accused a new trial. Based on the case's name, the courts and
commentators have named such a failure to disclose evidence a Brady violation. Twentytwo years after Brady, in Wood v. Bartholomew, the Court was faced with the question of
whether and when a prosecutor's failure to disclose inadmissible evidence could be the
basis for a Brady violation and new trial. The Court found that there was no Brady
violation in Wood, but its opinion was ambiguous as to whether the case created a per se
rule that failure to disclose inadmissible evidence can never be the basis for a Brady
violation or whether the application of Brady was highly dependent on the type of
evidence involved in the case. In the wake of the Court's decision, there has been a
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circuit split over whether and when a prosecutor's failure to disclose inadmissible
evidence can be the basis for a Brady violation and new trial.
Some circuits have held that Wood created a per se rule that failure to disclose
inadmissible evidence can never be the basis for a Brady violation. Such a bright line
rule would promote judicial and prosecutorial efficiency; prosecutors no longer have to
closely scrutinize whether every piece of inadmissible evidence in their files may be
material, and judges can summarily dispose of motions for new trials based on a
prosecutor's failure to disclose inadmissible evidence. Further, to the extent that
inadmissible evidence generally can have no direct impact on trial, it is difficult to argue
that its exclusion substantially impairs the rights of an accused. Conversely, inadmissible
evidence may lead directly to admissible evidence or be used to impeach a witness. To
this extent, a per se rule could encourage a prosecutor to withhold inadmissible evidence
from an accused when he knows this evidence could lead to highly probative evidence or
be used in some form at trial. At the same time, without aper se rule, prosecutors must
closely analyze every piece of inadmissible evidence in their possession to determine
whether it could assist the accused, and when the prosecutor does not disclose every
piece of evidence , defense counsel can file a motion for new trial based on a potential
Brady violation, threatening judicial economy. There is even the possibility that after a
new trial is granted based on failure of the prosecutor to disclose inadmissible evidence,
defense counsel will be unable to uncover any new material exculpatory evidence.
Overall, then, the circuit split after Wood presents difficult questions that directly
relate to the question of what constitutes a fair trial for an accused. Presently, an accused
in one state can be granted a new trial for the prosecutor's failure to disclose a piece of
evidence while an accused in another state has his Brady claim denied despite the same
piece of evidence being withheld. Application of widely divergent interpretations of
what constitutes the violation of a defendant's rights undermines the integrity of the
American criminal justice system. Therefore, this essay will critically analyze and
attempt to synthesize the approaches taken by different circuits. Part I will give a brief
history of how the Supreme Court has dealt with the failure of prosecutors to disclose
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material evidence to the defense. Part II will look at how several circuits have disparately
interpreted Wood. Finally, Part III will look at potential solutions to the circuit split.

I.

The Supreme Court's Treatment

of Brady Material Through

Wood
In 1963, in the seminal case of Brady v. Maryland, the Court held that
"suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request
violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment...."
Thirteen years later, the Court extended Brady to require prosecutors to disclose material
evidence even without a specific or general request by defense counsel.2 In United States
v. Bagley, the Court included material impeachment evidence under Brady's ambit of
protection.
In deciding whether to grant a new trial to petitioners under Brady, reviewing
courts must ask whether the prosecutor has withheld "material" evidence. The criterion
for materiality is whether "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors the result of the proceeding would have been different.'

4

A

reasonable probability is "a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome." 5
Finally, in Wood v. Bartholomew, the Court reviewed a case in which the Ninth
Circuit had found a Brady violation based on the prosecution's failure to disclose

* Colin Miller is a 2003 graduate of the William & Mary School of Law and currently an
attorney at the law firm Saltman & Stevens in Washington, D.C.
1373 U.S. 83 (1963).
2 United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107 (1976) (holding that, "if the
evidence is so clearly
supportive of a claim of innocence that it gives the prosecution notice of a duty to produce, that
duty should equally arise even if no request is made").
3 United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985) (construing Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S.
150, 154 (1972)) (holding that "[t]his Court has rejected any such distinction between
impeachment evidence and exculpatory evidence").
4 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984).
5

Id.
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inadmissible evidence to a defendant.6 The case involved the robbery of a laundromat,
and the "evidence" was an inadmissible polygraph test given to the defendant's brother.7
The brother was asked "whether he had assisted his brother in the robbery and whether at
any time he and his brother were in the laundromat together."

The brother answered

"No" to both questions, "and the examiner concluded that the responses indicated
deception." 9
The Court found no Brady violation based on several factors. First, the polygraph
results were "not 'evidence' at all" because they could not have been used in any manner
during the trial.10 Second, the Court of Appeals' determination that disclosure of the
results would have changed the outcome of the trial was "mere speculation." 1 1 It was
uncertain whether disclosure of the results would have led to a different defense trial
strategy, "additional discovery" leading to material evidence, or a pre-trial confession by
the brother. 12 This uncertainty was also compounded by the fact that a confession by the
brother "would have been in no way inconsistent with [the defendant's] guilt" and the
defense lawyer's statement that disclosure of the results would not have significantly
changed his trial practices.

13

In implementing Wood, the circuits had to answer whether

(1) it created a per se rule that failure to disclose inadmissible evidence can never be the
basis for a Brady violation; (2) it held that failure to disclose inadmissible evidence could
lead to a Brady violation only if disclosure would have led directly to admissible
evidence; or (3) Wood was largely limited to its facts, and failure to disclose material
evidence can be a Brady violation under many circumstances?

6

516 U.S. 1 (1995).

7 Id.

at 4.

8Id.
9 Id.
10 Id. at 6.
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Id. at 6-8.

5
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II.

The Circuit Split in Implementing Wood

A.

A Per Se Rule Against Inadmissible Evidence

The First, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits have held that Wood creates a per se rule
that a prosecutor's failure to disclose inadmissible evidence can never be the basis for a
Brady violation.

In United States v. Montalvo, the District Court for the District of

Puerto Rico held that suppressed alleged statements by a policeman "were mere layman's
opinion as to the victim's connection with drugs" 14 and thus inadmissible.

Citing a First

Circuit case from before Wood, the court held that there was no Brady violation because
"'inadmissible evidence is by definition not material [for Brady purposes]."' 16 Brady
only applies when the evidence in question could have affected the outcome of the trial.
Thus, "[i]nadmissible evidence is by definition not material because it never would have
reached the jury and therefore could not have affected the trial outcome."1 7
Similarly, the Fourth Circuit has found that if withheld statements were
"inadmissible at trial under Virginia's Rape Shield Statute, they would be, "as a matter of
law,

'immaterial'

for Brady purposes."

Concurrently, the Seventh Circuit has

concluded that "failure to disclose [an informant's] identity and background" did not
constitute a Brady violation because "evidence that would not have been admissible at
trial is immaterial because it could not have affected the trial's outcome." 19

20 F.Supp.2d 270, 277 (D. P.R. 1998).
15 See id. ("Opinion testimony on the veracity of the testimony
of another witness is not
admissible.").
16 Id. at 278 (quoting United States v. Ranney, 719 F.2d 1183, 1190 (1st Cir. 1983)).
Ranney, 719 F.2d, at 1190 (construing United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 105-06
(1976).
Hoke v. Netherland, 92 F.3d 1350, 1356 n.3 (4" Cir.1996) ") (construing Wood, 116
S. Ct., at 10).
19 United States v. Silva, 71 F.3d 667, 670 (7" Cir. 1995).
14
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Failure to Disclose Inadmissible Evidence Violates Brady Only if its
Disclosure Would Have Lead Directly to Admissible Evidence

The Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that failure to disclose
inadmissible evidence could constitute a Brady violation, but only if the petitioner can
definitively prove that its disclosure would have led directly to admissible evidence at or
before the original trial. For instance, in Wright v. Hopper, the Eleventh Circuit rejected
a claim that the prosecution's failure to disclose an inadmissible affidavit from a
detective containing hearsay constituted a Brady violation. 20 The petitioner had been
convicted of murdering storeowners during a robbery, and the affidavit contained a
-

girlfriend's statement that the gun used to kill the victims belonged to her boyfriend another suspect. 21

The court stressed that the defense had not called the "girlfriend as a witness at
the federal evidentiary hearing," so it was "unknown exactly what she would say...."22
Thus, the defense did not prove a direct link to admissible evidence, and "[a] court cannot
speculate as to what evidence the defense might have found if the information had been
disclosed." 23
Using similar reasoning, the Sixth Circuit has found that failure to disclose a videotape
containing hearsay was not a Brady violation and that "information withheld by the prosecution is
not material unless the information consists of, or would directly lead to, evidence admissible at
trial...."24 The Ninth Circuit has also concluded that failure to disclose the inadmissible evidence
of the existence of eliminated alternate suspects was not a Brady violation and that, "[t]o be
material, evidence must be admissible or must lead to admissible evidence."25 Apparently, then,
these circuits took the "mere speculation" language of Wood to mean that the defense must be
able to prove a direct and definite link to admissible evidence at or before trial for there to be a
Brady violation.

169 F.3d 695, 703-04 (11th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 703.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 United States v. Phillip, 948 F.2d 241,
249 (6th Cir. 1991).
25 Coleman v. Calderon, 150 F.3d 1105, 1117
( 9 th Cir. 1998).
20
21
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Wood is Limited to its Facts
C.
The Second and Fifth Circuits have found that failure to disclose inadmissible
evidence can be a Brady violation even if it would not have led directly to admissible
evidence. In the Fifth Circuit case, United States v. Gil, Gil was found guilty "on a
variety of mail fraud counts" related to "false and inflated invoices."26 Gil's defense was
that "the overpayments were intended to compensate him for work he performed outside
the contract...."27 After conviction, the prosecution turned over a memorandum to the
defense that Gil claimed detailed the meeting "at which the inflated billings were
authorized....

,,28

The court found a Brady violation, holding that, even if the

memorandum were inadmissible or did not lead directly to admissible evidence, it could
have been "an effective tool in disciplining witnesses during cross-examination by
refreshment of recollection or otherwise." 29
In the Fifth Circuit case, Spence v. Johnson, the court found no Brady violation
but re-affirmed its pre-Wood decision in Sellers v. Estelle.31 There, the court first found
that inadmissible evidence was material under Brady because, after disclosure, "[the
petitioner] may have been able to produce witnesses whose testimony or written
statements may have been admissible."32 Second, it found the inadmissible evidence
"was material to the preparation of the petitioner's defense, regardless of whether it [was]
intended to be admitted into evidence or not."3 3

26
27
28

297 F.3d 93, 94 (5
Id.
Id. at 96-97.

Cir. 2002).

29

Id. at 104.

30

80 F.3d 989, 998 (5 Cir. 1996).

3
32

651 F.2d 1074 (5 Cir. 1981).
Spence, 80 F.3d, at 998 (quoting Sellers, 651 F.2d, at 1077 n.6) (alteration in original).

33

Id.
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Resolving the Circuit Split
A.

"Not Evidence at All"?

There are justifications for the per se rule established by certain circuits. When
there are complicated rules for determining whether inadmissible evidence is material,
already overburdened prosecutors need to sift through and closely analyze every piece of
information they have collected to determine their disclosure obligation. Requiring
prosecutors to turn over information that is preliminary and inconsequential would waste
governmental resources. Concurrently, given that there is no bright line rule for
materiality, petitioners might use a rule permitting Brady challenges based on
inadmissible evidence to challenge convictions based on prosecutorial non-disclosure of
any piece of information no matter how inconsequential,, compromising judicial
economy.
Conversely, to the extent that the arguments for a per se rule rest on the
assumption that inadmissible evidence is not evidence at all and would never reach the
jury, that assumption is fallacious. Consider the argument in Gil that the inadmissible
memorandum could have been used to refresh the recollection of witnesses. Under the
Federal Rules of Evidence, if the memorandum were used to refresh a witness'
recollection while or before testifying, the "adverse party [would be] entitled
to.. .introduce in evidence those portions which relate to the testimony of the witness."34
In such a case, the previously inadmissible memorandum could both become admissible
evidence and be viewed directly by jurors, defeating both of the justifications for the per
se rule. In Gil, an employer who did not recall the meeting authorizing Gil's
overpayments could have had his recollection refreshed by an attorney using the
memorandum, making the document highly probative. With a per se rule, the attorney
would never have had that opportunity, resulting in substantial injustice.

34

FED. R. EVID. 612.

9
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In contrast, some evidence, like evidence excluded by Rape Shield statutes, will
truly never be admissible for any purpose. There might also be other justifications for
failing to disclose this information to the defense. For instance, disclosing evidence of a
rape victim's prior sexual partners can cause extreme shame to the victim. This evidence
is of a fundamentally different nature than the evidence in Gil. Even circuits currently
applying a per se rule should recognize this distinction and find that inadmissible
evidence that could itself become admissible is material potentially subject to Brad.

B.

Inadmissible Evidence Used Solely for Trial Preparation

At the same time, the 5" Circuit likely went too far in finding that inadmissible
evidence can be material even if it only would have been used for trial preparation and
not as evidence at trial. There is a decent argument that Sellers was correctly decided.
Sellers claimed innocence but was found guilty of a school shooting and sentenced to life
in prison; however, his conviction was reversed under Brady because the prosecution
withheld an inadmissible report.

The report contained statements by another student

claiming that he was the gunman but also implicating Sellers. 35 Clearly, if given this
report, Sellers' attorney could have changed his trial strategy.

Seeing the document,

Sellers might have admitted guilt, and his attorney could then have changed his strategy
to arguing that Sellers was not the gunman and that he should receive a lesser sentence.
Still, the central problem with this test for materiality is that the Supreme Court
explicitly rejected it in United States v. Agurs.36 Perhaps anticipating Sellers, the Court
noted that this test "would necessarily encompass incriminating evidence as well as
exculpatory evidence [because] knowledge of the prosecutor's entire case would always

Sellers, 651 F.2d, at 1075.
36 427 U.S. 97, 113 n.20 (holding that "focus[ing] on
the impact of the undisclosed
evidence on the defendant's ability to prepare for trial, rather than the materiality of the
evidence to the issue of guilt or innocence.. .would be unacceptable for determining the
materiality of...'Brady material'...").
3s

10
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be useful in planning the defense." 37 The report in Sellers was inculpatory to the extent
that it implicated the defendant in the crime, and it only would have helped the defendant
on re-trial because he apparently lied at the original trial. If, at the original trial, Sellers
had admitted that he participated in the shooting, the report could not have altered his
attorney's trial strategy on re-trial, and it would have been immaterial. Because such an
approach would put the perjurer in a better position than the honest defendant, the Court
rejected it as too broad an extension of Brady.
The Court also noted that "such an approach would primarily involve an analysis
of the adequacy of the notice given to the defendant by the State, and it has always been
the Court's view that the notice component of due process refers to the charge rather than
the evidentiary support for the charge." 38 The Sellers approach necessarily switches the
court's focus from the materiality of the evidence to the quality of the defense attorney
and the notice given.

As an example, a court might need to inquire into whether a

moderately qualified defense attorney receiving inadmissible evidence three days earlier
could have altered his trial strategy enough to change the trial's outcome. Such a focus
belies the Court's position since Brady that the materiality inquiry should turn primarily
on the quality of the evidence and not the behavior of the attorneys involved.3 9

C.

When the Link Must be Determined

There is some merit to the argument that petitioners who do not show that
inadmissible evidence would lead to admissible evidence by trial cannot prove a Brady
violation. If an appellate court grants a new trial under Brady without defense proving a
direct link, a new trial could be conducted without there being any new admissible
evidence.

Requiring a showing that undisclosed inadmissible evidence would at least

37Id.
38

Id.

See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110 (1976) (holding that, "[i]f the suppression
of evidence results in constitutional error, it is because of the character of the evidence,
not the character of the prosecutor").
'9
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have led to admissible evidence would also appear consistent with Wood's requirement
that the defense's case be based on more than "mere speculation."40

Even when the

defense can prove a definitive link to admissible evidence, however, it is difficult to
prove a reasonable probability that the evidence would have changed the outcome of the
trial. When the defense has not proven this link, it is asking the court to accept that it
might be able to find evidence and that this amorphous evidence would likely have
changed the trial's outcome. While the Court has never defined "mere speculation," this
two-step process appears dangerously close to it.
A review of Hopper,4 1 however, reveals why this approach would provide
improper motivations to defense counsel and prosecutors. In Hopper, the court found no
Brady violation because the defense did not call a witness - - who was quoted in an
undisclosed affidavit as saying the gun supposedly used by the defendant belonged to her
boyfriend - - at the evidentiary hearing. This begs the question of why the defense would
call a witness when the prosecution has failed to disclose the very evidence that would
provide the reason for calling her. Under Hopper's analysis, the defense would have an
incentive to call every potential witness and ask endless questions in case the prosecution
has withheld evidence. Hopper would also motivate unethical prosecutors to withhold
inadmissible evidence about potential witnesses the defense is unaware of, even when the
government knows this evidence could lead to highly probative evidence.

Thus, there

should not be an absolute rule that a link to admissible evidence must be proved by trial.

D.

Why the "Dent Rule" Does Not Resolve the Circuit Split

The one author who has attempted to resolve the circuit split recommended the
Third Circuit's approach in United States v. Dent.42 There, "Dent sought to subpoena the

See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
41 169 F.3d 695 (11" Cir.
1999).
42 149 F.3d 180 (3d
Cir. 1998).
40
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personnel file of his arresting officer," but "[t]he district court reviewed the file in camera
and concluded that it did not contain exculpatory or proper impeachment evidence and
thus granted the government's motion to quash the subpoena." 43 "On appeal, the Third
Circuit upheld the district court's ruling" and held that the district court judge's decision
should stand unless it was arbitrary. 44 While Dent dealt with subpoenas, the author felt
its analysis was "adaptable to the problem of inadmissible evidence."4

Under what

would be called the "Dent Rule," "[a]fter receiving a discovery request," "the prosecutor
would be required to disclose all potentially exculpatory information to the court so that a
judge could make a determination as to whether it should be disclosed."4 6
Initially, this rule would have to be altered because Brady also covers evidence
that was not specifically requested.4 7 Assuming the rule were broadened, it would have
some appeal. Because prosecutors would no longer have to determine materiality, they
would be relieved of a substantial burden. Also, because judges are impartial, they would
be better able to make rulings unaffected by partisan interest in disadvantaging the
defense.
Still, all this rule would do is shift the burden from prosecutors to judges. Under
the proposed rule, already overburdened federal judges would be forced to review
everything in prosecutors' files to determine materiality.

Also, while judges are more

objective, prosecutors are more likely to know the strengths and weaknesses of their
cases and how a particular piece of evidence could alter the outcome of trial. Finally,
even with the rule, courts would still have to make materiality determinations after
noncompliance. Assume a prosecutor fails to comply with the Dent Rule and withholds
evidence that could be material.

The court could hold that such withholding should

Gregory S. Seador, Note, A Search for the Truth or a Game of Strategy? The Circuit
Split over the Prosecutor'sObligation to Disclose Inadmissible Exculpatory Information
to the Accused, 51 SYRACUSE L. REV. 139, 160 (2001).
43

44 Id.
45
46

47

Id. at 160-61.
Id. at 161.
See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985)
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automatically result in a new trial under Brady. Requiring the court to find a Brady
violation on such facts , though, would be nonsensical if the evidence would be of no
meaningful assistance to the defense. A superficially more workable approach might be
to to establish a rule requiring the court to sanction the prosecutor for nondisclosure of
possibly material evidence, while focusing the separate Brady inquiry on whether the
nondisclosed evidence was in fact material.

And that would leave courts in the same

situation they would have been in before adoption of a "Dent Rule."

IV.

Conclusion
Materiality determinations under Brady are difficult, and the Court's decision in

Wood only complicated matters.

As a result, the lower courts currently use widely

different standards to determine when prosecutorial non-disclosure of evidence violates
the rights of an accused, meaning that those rights are somewhat contingent on the trial
court's location. Such inconsistent applications of a Supreme Court decision undermine
the integrity of the American criminal justice system and the convictions or acquittals of
every defendant where inadmissible evidence is withheld by prosecutors. In the absence
of a Supreme Court case resolving this conflict, there must be some other method by
which to reconcile the divergent approaches taken by the circuits in implementing Wood.
Circuits have primarily erred in implementing Wood to the extent that they have
attempted to adopt per se rules to address questions that must be resolved on a case-bycase basis. Where the appellate courts hold that failure to disclose inadmissible evidence
can never lead to a Brady violation, prosecutors are rewarded by withholding evidence
that might be very useful to an accused. Conversely, if courts were to grant a new trial
whenever a prosecutor failed to submit every piece of evidence he had to a judge,new
trials would proceed even when there was no indication that the defense would be able
to present any new evidence on retrial.
Those per se approaches are clearly unworkable. Thehe Fifth Circuit's apparent
conclusion that even failure to disclose inculpatory evidence that defense would have
used to change a not guilty plea to a guilty plea while asking for a reduced sentence
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seems to conflict with

Brady in a different way.
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Brady ostensibly stands for the

principle when an accused is deprived of a material piece of evidence which could have
helped him prove his innocence, his rights have been violated, and he deserves a new
trial.
In essence, then, resolving the circuit split after Wood simply comes down to the
guiding principle behind Brady. When a prosecutor fails to disclose an inadmissible
piece of evidence, the court should closely analyze the likelihood that disclosure of that
piece of evidence would have helped the accused to prove his innocence. This
determination should hinge solely on the quality of that evidence. The court should ask
whether the evidence in question could have led to admissible evidence or been used
itself at trial. If circuit courts return the Wood analysis to the principle behind Brady,
their approaches to materiality determinations will be far less disparate and their
determinations of what constitutes the violation of the rights of the accused far more
uniform.
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